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JEANNE DORAN et aI., Appellants, V. CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[So F. No. 19191. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1955.] 
JULES BESSETTE, Appellant, V. CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-Inherent Improb-
ability of Testimony.-In actions for injuries sustained by 
pedestrians when struck by trolley bus near center of street, 
where plaintiffs testified that, after stepping from curb into 
street, they observed bus had stopped at corner of intersection 
about 120 feet away, and that they then walked straight across 
street, did not stop at any time in making such crossing, and 
saw approaching bus when they were at center of street, any 
testimony of plaintiffs that bus was still at corner and was just 
starting to move at time they crossed center of street is in-
herently improbable since it cannot be reconciled with hap-
pening of accident, and such evidence cannot be deemed sub-
stantial. 
(S] Negligence-Last Olear Ohance-Elements of Doctrine.-Last 
olear chance doctrine presupposes that plaintiff has been negli-
gent, and as result thereof, is in position of danger from which 
he cannot escape by exercise of ordinary care, and this includes 
Dot only where it is physically impossible for him to escape. 
hut also in cases where he is totally unaware of his danger 
and for that reason unable to escape, that defendant has 
knowledge that plaintiff is in such situation, and knows, or in 
exercise of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff can-
Dot escape; and that defendant has last clear chance to avoid 
accident by exercising ordinary care and fails to do so, and 
plaintiff is injured as result of such failure. 
(Sa,3b] Id.-Last Olear Ohance-Elements of Doctrine.-If any 
one of elements of last clear chance doctrine is absent, doctrine 
does not apply and ease is governed by ordinary rules of negli-
gence and contributory negligence. 
[2] Doctrine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 1041; 171 
A.L.R. 1365. See also Oal.Jur., Negligence, § SO; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Street Railways, § 127(2); [2, 3] 
Negligence, §4S; [4,16] Street Railways, §102(8); [5,17] Negli-
gence, § 48(2); [6] Negligence, § 148; [7, 12-14] Negligence, 
§ 48(1) i [8] Negligence, § 217; [9] Negligence, § 156; [10] Negli-
aenee, 148(4); [11,15] Negligence, § 49. 
D 
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[4] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-Evidenee-Last 
Olear Ohanee.-In actions for injuries sustained by pedestrians 
when struck by trolley bus while crossing street, plaintiffs 
were not "totally unaware" of their danger, as contentplated 
by last clear chance doctrine, where they knew of presence 
of bus as they started to cross strcet and also knew that it was 
moving toward them when they again looked to right while 
nearing center of relatively narrow street, and, with this 
knowledge, proceeded to step directly into path of oncoming 
bus. 
[6] Negligence-Last Clear Chance-Plaintiff's Position of Peril.-
Total unawareness of danger, as contemplated by last clear 
chance doctrine, does not exist where injured party is fully 
aware of approach of oncoming vehicle up to instant before 
collision and then shifts his attention to look in some other 
direction while proceeding directly into its path. 
[6a,6b] Id.-Evidence-Last Clear Ohance.-Last clear chance 
doctrine, which relieves injured party of results of his own 
contributory negligence and permits him to recover despite 
such negligence, is applicable only in exceptional case in which 
there is substantial evidence to support favorable finding on 
each of several required elements of such doctrine. 
[?] Id.-Last Clear Ohance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-"Continuing 
negligence" of injured party does not deprive him of benefit 
of last clear chance doctrine if all required elements for appli-
cation of doctrine are present, since SUt>D "continuing negli-
gence" ordinarily exists in all last clear p·ld.IlCe cases. 
[8] Id.-Instructions-Last Olear Ohance.-Whether there is any 
substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which could 
justify application of last clear chance doctrine in given ease, 
is question of law, and in absence of such evidence it is error 
for trial court to instruct jury concerning such doctrine. 
[9] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Last Olear Ohance.'-:"'If there 
is substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which would 
justify application of last clear chance doctrine, whether de-
fendant should be held to have had last clear chance to avoid 
accident is question of fact to be determined by jury under 
appropriate circumstances. 
[10] Id.-Last Olear Ohanea-Defendant's Knowledge of Plaintiff's 
Inability to Save Himself.-Underlying basis for application 
of last clear chance doctrine is that defendant was afforded a 
last and a clear chance to avoid accident after defendant had 
discovered that plaintiff was in helpless condition; it is based 
on humanitarian concept that fault of injured party should 
not relieve erring defendant of his liability after actually dis-
covering that it is too late for injured party to avail himself 
of any similar chance. 
) 
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[11] Id. - Last Olear Oha.nce - Ooncurrent or Contempora.neous 
Negligence.-Last clear chance doctrine excludes from its ap-
plication any case in which plaintiff's state of helplessness, 
resulting from his own negligence, is created so nearly simul-
taneously with happening of accident that neither party may 
be fairly said thereafter to have last clear chance to avoid acci-
dent. 
[12] Id.-Last Clear Chance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-Doctrine of 
plaintiff's continuing negligence has no application unless 
negligence is proximate cause of injury. 
[1S] Id.-Last Olear Chance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-If all ele-
ments of doctrine of last clear chance are present and plain-
tiff's negligence becomes remote in causation, then doctrine 
applies; but if any of elements of doctrine are absent, plain-
tiff's negligence being continuous and contributory with that of 
defendant bars recovery. 
[14] Id. - Last Clear Chance - Negligence of Plaintiff.-Main 
factor which may make plaintiff's negligence a remote rather 
than proximate cause of accident, as contemplated by last 
clear chance doctrine, is existence of some appreciable interval 
after time that plaintiff has reached state of helplessness as 
to enable defendant to gain actual knowledge of plaintiff's 
state of helplessness and to have last clear chance to avoid 
accident. 
[16] Id. - Last Olear Chance - Concurrent or Contempora.neous 
Negligence.-When plaintiff is actually aware of approach of 
oncoming vehicle and when his negligent act, which removes 
him from position of safety, occurs almost simultaneously 
with happening of accident, there can be no such appreciable 
interval thereafter as to enable defendant to gain knowledge 
of plaintiff's helplessness and to have last clear chance to 
avoid accident; in such case plaintiff's· negligence is not 
"remote in causation" but is, in eyes of law, proximate cause 
of accident, and last clear chance doctrine has no application. 
[16a,1Gb] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-Evidence-
Last Olear Chance.-In action for injuries sustained by pedes-
trians when struck by trolley bus while crossing street, plain-
tiffs were not in position of danger nor in state of helplessness, 
within meaning of last clear chance doctrine, until they had 
ftached point at which they could no longer escape by exercise 
of ordinary care, and where their state of helplessness was 
created only by their act of leaving their position of safety 
near center of street and stepping directly into path of danger, 
and they could not have taken more than two or three steps 
after leaving place of safety before accident occurred, their 
act of negligence in leaving such place of safety occurred 
almost simultaneously with happening of accident, and de-
) 
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fendants thereafter did not have last olear ohance to avoid 
accident. 
[17] Negligence-Last Clear OhanC&-PJ.a,intUf's Position of PerU. 
-Term "place of safety" ordinarily includes position of plain-
tiff while he is merely approaching plaee of danger, and he 
cannot invoke last olear chance doctrine so long as he is only 
approaohing but is not actually in position of danger. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order granting 
a new trial. Robert L. McWilliams, Judge, in S. F. No. 19190; 
Melvyn I. Cronin, Judge, in S. F. No. 19191. Judgment and 
order affirmed. 
Actions for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrians 
when struck by trolley bus while crossing street. Order 
granting defendant a new trial in S. F. No. 19190, affirmed; 
judgment for defendant in S. F. No. 19191, affirmed. 
Fitz-Gerald Ames, Sr., and Harold A. Galloway for Ap-
pellants. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Jerome Cohen, Deputy 
City Attorney, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-This is a consolidated appeal by plaintiffs 
in two personal injury actions which were separately tried but 
which arose out of the same accident. It is submitted on two 
separate settled statements, which are substantially the same 
in their presentation of the evidence and are so treated by 
counsel for plaintiffs in discussing the legal points in the joint 
briefs presented on plaintiffs' behalf. Plaintiff Doran appeals 
from an order granting a new trial after judgment in her 
favor. Plaintiff Bessette appeals from a judgment in favor 
of defendants. 
In the Doran case the trial court instructed the jury on 
the last clear chance doctrine, and then granted a new trial 
solely on the ground that it had erred in giving that instruc-
tion. In the Bessette case the trial court refused to instruct 
on that doctrine. Plaintiffs contend that the last clear chance 
instruction was properly given in the Doran case, and that 
therefore the order granting defendants' motion for a new 
trial in that case should be reversed. They further contend 
that the requested instruction on the last clear chance doctrine 
should havp. been iiven in the Bessette case, and that there-
) 
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fore the judgment in favor of defendants in that case should 
be reversed. While defendants make no objection to the form 
of plaintiffs' requested instructions, they maintain that the 
evidence was insufficient to justify the giving of the last clear 
chance instruction in either case, and that therefore the order 
and jUdgment should be affirmed. The evidence was sub-
stantially the same in both cases but viewing that evidence in 
the light most favorable to plaintiffs (Roda.baugh v. Tekus, 
39 Ca1.2d 290, 291 [246 P.2d 663] ; Daniels v. Oity & Oounty 
of Ban Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 617 [255 P.2d 785]), we 
have nevertheless concluded that defendants' position must 
be sustained. 
On March 17, 1950, about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck 
by defendants' electric overhead trolley bus as they were 
crossing Union Street at a point approximately 120 feet 
west of the intersection with Fillmore Street, in San Fran-
cisco. Plaintiff Jules Bessette, accompanied by plaintiff 
Jeanne Doran, had parked his automobile on the south side 
of Union Street, about 100 feet west of Fillmore. Union 
Street is relatively narrow, being 44 feet 9 inches from curb 
to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs on both 
sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west on the 
sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into Union 
Street intending to cross the street to a theatre on the op-
posite (north) side. Defendants' trolley bus, traveling west 
on Union Street, had crossed Fillmore and stopped in front 
of a drugstore on the northwest corner of the intersection. 
There were two sets of streetcar tracks on Union Street, and 
the bus was stopped parallel to the curb with its right wheels 
just to the right of the most northerly rail of the car tracks. 
Plaintiffs testified that after they had stepped into Union 
Street and were a few feet from the south curb, they stopped, 
"looked around," observed the bus stopped to their right 
at the comer but saw no moving traffic, and then proceeded 
straight, not diagonally, across the street. When they reached 
the center of the street and were between the two sets of 
tracks, they looked again to the right and saw the bus moving 
in their direction. When plaintiff Bessette saw the bus for 
the second time, he II could not tell if it moved any distance 
from the point where h~ first saw it when it was stopped." 
Plaintiff Doran testified: II When I was in the middle of the 
street, I don't know how far the bus was from me. I know 
the bus was going in my direction. . . . I cannot tell you if 
it had gone half wq. I don't know if it waa aa close .. 10 
61 eM II 
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feet to me when I saw it the second time. As I was crossing 
the street, I know the bus was coming in my direction but 
I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or would 
continue to go along." Neither plaintiff looked again in the 
direction of the bus, but they continued to walk into its 
path. Their memory of events ends there. 
The bus driver testified that he was traveling between 15 
to 20 miles per hour when he first saw plaintiffs running 
diagonally across the street. At that time they were 15 to 
20 feet ahead of the bus, 3 feet to its left and in the center 
of the street, looking straight ahead in the direction in which 
they were going. The bus headlights were on low beam. 
The street lights and the theatre marquee and sign lights 
were burning. Looking ahead from his stopped position at 
the corner in front of the drugstore, the bus driver could see 
parked cars the full length of the block on both sides of the 
street; and there was nothing in the street to obstruct his 
view. After starting the bus, he traveled some two or three 
coach lengths (a coach length is 35 feet) before he saw plain-
tiffs. He then immediately applied his brakes and swerved 
to the left, but the right front half of the bus struck plaintiffs. 
The bus traveled 4 to 6 feet between the point of impact and 
the stop. Traveling at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour 
when he first saw plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the 
bus within 23 to 26 feet, including reaction time. He did not 
sound his horn but used both hands to turn the steering wheel 
in an effort to avoid striking plaintiffs. He could not state 
why he did not see plaintiffs sooner in the street, except for 
these prevailing circumstances: plaintiffs were wearing semi-
dark clothing-plaintiff Doran in a dark brown coat, white 
blouse and beige skirt, and plaintiff Bessette in a gray suit 
and" sel't of brown" overcoat; the stores on both sides of the 
street, excepting the corner drugstore and the theatre, both 
on the north side, were dark; and the southerly part of Union 
Street was a dark ba\:;kground at approximately the spot where 
he first saw plaintiffs. 
[1] It thus appears that the only real conflict in the evi-
dence was on the question of whether plaintiffs walked straight, 
or ran diagonally, across the street and into the path of the 
bus. Aceepting plaintiffs' testimony, it will be assumed that 
they walked straight across. But plaintiffs' own testimony 
further showed that they did not stop at any time in making 
such crossing, and that they saw the approaching bus when 
they we;re at the center of the street. Their own e.xhibits 
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(plaintiff Doran's Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 7 and plaintiff Bes-
sette's Exhibit 1) left no doubt as to the place where the 
accident occurred. The point of impact was shown to have 
been at a point near the center of the street, and no further 
north than the center of the westbound tracks, which was 
approximately 6 feet from the center of the street. Hence 
plaintiffs' own testimony affirmatively showed that there could 
not possibly have been any appreciable interval between the 
time that they left a place of safety and the time that the 
accident occurred. In this situation it is understandable that 
plaintiffs should have admitted that they did not know how 
far the bus was from them when they were at the center of 
the street or how many steps they took after passing the 
center of the street; and in the light of these admissions and 
the abovementioned admitted facts, any testimony of plaintiffs 
to the effect that the bus was still at the corner (about 120 
feet away) and was just starting to move at the time that 
plaintiffs crossed the center of the street is inherently improb-
able as it cannot be reconciled with the happening of the 
accident. Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be 
substantial evidence on that subject. 
[2] Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chanee 
applies in a particular case depends wholly upon the existence 
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to bring it into play. 
The doctrine presupposes: " (1) That plaintiff has been 
negligent and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger 
from which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care; 
and this includes not only where it is physically impossible 
for him to escape, but also in cases where he is totally unaware 
of his danger and for that reason unable to escape; (2) that 
defendant has knowledge' that the plaintiff is in such a situa-
tion, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and 
(3) has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exer-
cising ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the 
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proxi-
mate result of such faHUl'e." (Danie'ts v. Oity &- Oounty of 
Ban Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 619,) [3a] If anyone 
of these elements is absent, the doctrine does not apply and 
the case is governcd by the ordinary rules of negligence and 
contributory negligence. (Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696, 
700 [218 P. 36].) 
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here 
because plaintiffs were aware of their dangerous position and 
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could have saved themselves by the exercise of ordinary care. 
Concededly, plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in crossing 
the street in the middle of the block directly in the path of 
the oncoming bus. They saw the bus shortly after leaving 
the curb. They again looked to their right and saw the bus 
approaching when they were in the center of the street, but 
nevertheless they continued on their way without again 
glancing in that direction. Defendants therefore maintain 
that it cannot be said that plaintiffs, after seeing the approach-
ing bus and then stepping into its path, were "totally un-
aware" of their dangerous position within the purview of 
the last clear chance doctrine. 
[4] In their effort to answer defendants' contention re-
lating to the first required element, plaintiffs apparently 
realize that they cannot claim that they were in a position 
of danger from which it was "physically impossible" for 
them to escape until after they had passed the center of the 
street and had stepped directly into the path of the oncoming 
bus. They therefore rely mainly upon their claim that they 
were "totally unaware" of their danger. This latter claim 
finds no support in the evidence. Plaintiffs concededly knew 
of the presence of the bus as they started to cross the street, 
and also knew that it was moving toward them when they 
again looked to the right while near the center of the rela-
tively narrow street. With this knowledge, they proceeded 
to step directly into the path of the oncoming bus; and in 
the light of this admitted knowledge, it cannot be said that 
plaintiffs were "totally unaware" of their danger. [5] Total 
unawareness of dang~r, as contemplated by the doctrine, does 
not exist where the injured party is fully aware of the 
approach of an oncoming vehicle up to the instant before 
the collision and then shifts his attention to look in some 
other direction while proceeding directly into its path. 
Plair~tiffs have cited no case in which the last clear chance 
doctrine has been held applicable to any comparable factual 
situation. On the contrary, in a case which is closely parallel 
on its facts, it was held that the doctrine was not applicable. 
(Palmer v. Tschudy, s'upra, l!H Cal. 696.) There the plain-
tiff, a pedestrian, upon reaching the curb, glanced to her 
right and saw defendant's automobile approaching at a 
distance of approximately 200 feet. She started to cross the 
street and when she had tal,en two or three steps from the 
curb, she again glanccfl to her right and saw defendant's 
automobile still approaching and, of course, nearer. Without 
) 
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again looking at the approaching automobile, she proceeded 
to cross the street and was struck and injured. The trial 
court there instructed on the last clear chance doctrine, and 
the judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed because of 
the error in giving such an instruction. This court recognized 
that the last clear chance doctrine may be applied when the 
injured party is totally unaware of the danger but held that 
"plaintiff was aware of it from the beginning." (P. 701.) 
Plaintiffs cite numerous cases where the last clear chance 
doctrine has been held applicable but all are distinguishable 
on their facts. Some of these cases involved situations where 
there was evidence to show that the injured person was in 
fact "totally unaware" of the danger. In Girdner v. Union 
Oil 00., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 915], the trial court found 
upon sufficient evidence that "up to the time of the collision, 
he (plaintiff) did not see and was totally oblivious of the 
approach of the truck, and the danger that confronted him." 
(P. 200.) In Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., 216 Cal. 205 [13 
P.2d 918], the evidence showed that the plaintiff "did not 
see the approach of the automobile that struck him." (P. 206.) 
And in the more recent decision of Peterson v. Burkhalter, 
88 Ca1.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], there was evidence to show 
that the injured boy did not see the defendant's oncoming 
automobile. The boy in approaching the intersection on his 
motor scoot.er and while 75 feet therefrom was "looking over 
his right shoulder in the opposite direction," and as he 
neared the intersection he "was still looking over his right 
shoulder." (P. 109.) Other cases cited by plaintiffs involved 
situations where there was evidence to show that the vehicle 
in which the injured person was traveling was either stalled 
or stopped practically directly in the path in which defendant 
was traveling. (Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102 [237 P.2d 
645]; Daniels v. Oity & Oounty of Ban Francisco, supra, 
40 Ca1.2d 614; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Ca1.2d 
630 [255 P.2d 795].) It thus appears that in each of the 
cited cases there was evidence from which the trier of the 
facts could find that plaintiff's negligence had placed him 
in a position of danger from which he could not escape by 
the exercise of ordinary care either (1) because it was 
"physically impossible for him to escape" or (2) because 
he was "totally unaware of his danger and for that reason 
unable to escape." Under such circumstances, there was no 
lack of evidence to support a finding of the presence of the 
firit required element for the application of the last clear 
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chance doctrine. Of course, in each of said cases, it was also 
held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiff was in 
such a situation, and that defendant thereafter had a "last 
clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary 
care" but failed to do so. 
It would serve no useful purpose to review all of the author-
ities dealing with the applicability of the last clear chance 
doctrine. Many of them have been reviewed in the recent 
decisions of this court, and it has been recognized that some 
cases have "presented close questions concerning the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to warrant the application of the 
doctrine." (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 297.) 
It was further stated in the earlier case of Girdner v. Union 
Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 202-203, that any "apparent 
confusion which exists in some of the decisions upon the 
subject arises in the application of the law to the facts, but 
as to the rule itself there is little or no confusion." A sum-
mary of the rules established by the recent cases may serve 
to dispel any apparent confusion that may be said to exist 
by reason of certain earlier decisions. 
The ordinary case presenting the issues of negligence and 
contributory negligence is governed by the traditional rules 
which cover those issues, and which make contributory negli-
gence a bar to recovery by the injured party. [6a.] The last 
clear chance doctrine, which relieves an injured party of the 
results of his own contributory negligence and permits him 
to recover despite such negligence, is applicable only in the 
exceptional case in which there is substantial evidence to 
support a favorable finding on each of the several required 
elements above enumerated. [3b] And as above indicated, 
if anyone of these elements is absent, the doctrine does not 
apply and the case is governed by the ordinary rules of negli-
gence and contributory negligen<>e. (Palmer v. Tschudy, 
supra, 191 Cal. 696, 700; Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal. 
2d 290, 293; also Girdner v. Union Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal. 
197, 202; Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 
40 Ca1.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra, 
40 Ca1.2d 630, 635.) [7] In this connection, it should be 
emphasized that the "continuing negligence" of the injured 
party does not deprive him of the benefit of the last clear 
chance doctrine if all the required elements for the application 
of that doctrine are present, for such "continuing negligence" 
ordinarily exists in all last clear chance cases. (Girdner v. 
) 
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Union Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 203; Oenter v. Yellow 
Oab Co., supra, 216 Cal. 205, 207-208; Selinsky v. Olsen, 
supra, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 104-105; Peterson v. Burkhalter, supra, 
38 Ca1.2d 107, 111.) 
[8] The question of whether there is any substantial 
evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which could justify the 
application of the last clear chance doctrine in a given case, 
is a question of law; and in the absence of such evidence, it 
is error for the trial court to instruct the jury concerning 
that doctrine. (Wallis v. Southern Pac. 00., 184 Cal. 662, 
672 [195 P. 408, 15 A.L.R. 117] ; Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 
39 Ca1.2d 290, 297; Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 
54 Cal.App.2d 528, 543 [129 P.2d 503] ; Dalley v. Williams, 
73 Cal.App.2d 427, 431-432 [166 P.2d 595].) [9] On the 
other hand, if there is such substantial evidence, conflicting 
or otherwise, the question of whether the defendant should 
be held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident 
is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under 
appropriate instructions. (Girdner v. Union Oil 00., supra, 
216 Cal. 197, 204; Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., supra, 216 Cal. 
205, 208; Selinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 106; Peter-
son v. Burkhalter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, 113; Daniels v. Oity 
&- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614, 619, 622-
623; Sills v. Los Angeles T1'ansit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 
630, 635-636, 638,) 
While the determination of the question of law above-
mentioned is not free from difficulty in certain borderline 
cases, the cited authorities show that the courts have not 
hesitated to hold that the doctrine could be applied whenever 
it may be fairly said that there is substantial evidence, con-
flicting or otherwise, upon which to base a finding of the 
presence of each of the required elements. [6b] These au-
thorities recognize, however, that it is only the exceptional 
case to which the doctrine may be applied, and that the mere 
fact that there is ample evidence to show that a defendant 
is negligent, without substantial evidence of the existence of 
the other required elements, will not warrant the application 
of the last clear chance doctrine. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 
supra, 39 Ca1.2d 290, 293.) 
[10] The underlying basis for the application of this 
doctrine, which permits an injured person to recover despite 
his continuing and contributory negligence, is that defendant 
was afforded a last chance and a clear chance to avoid the 
accident alter defendant had discovered that plaintitf was 
) 
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in a helpless situation. It is based upon the humanitarian 
concept that the fault of the injured party should not relieve 
the erring defendant of his liability if defendant is afforded 
such last clear chance to avoid the accident after actually 
discovering that it is too late for the injured party to avail 
himself of any similar chance. [11] But the chance which 
is afforded to defendant must be something more than a bare 
possible chance. It must be not only a last chance but a clear 
chance, following actual knowledge of plaintiff's helplessness, 
to a void the accident by the exercise of ordinary care; and, 
by its very terms, the doctrine excludes from its application 
any case in which plaintiff's state of helplessness, resulting 
from his own negligence, is created so nearly simultaneously 
with the happening of the accident that neither party may 
be fairly said to have thereafter a last clear chance to avoid 
the accident. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 
294-296; Poncino v. Reid-Murdock &- 00., 136 Cal.App. 223, 
229-232 [28 P.2d 932] ; Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 
supra, 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532, 542.) 
In applying the foregoing principles, it is helpful to bear 
in mind the decisions which rationalize the last clear chance 
doctrine in terms of proximate cause. (Girdner v. Union Oil 
Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 204; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 
supra, 216 Cal. 205, 207-208; Sparks v. Redinger, ante, 
p. 121 [279 P.2d 971].) [12] As was said in the Center 
case at pages 207-208: "'£he doctrine of (plaintiff's) con-
tinuing negligence has no application unless the negligence is 
the proximate cause of the injury. [13] If all the elements of 
the doctrine of the last clear chance are present and plaintiff" 
negligence becomes remote in causation, then the doctrine 
applies. If, on the other hand, any of the elements of the 
doctrine are lacking, courts have declared, and rightfully so, 
that plaintiff's negligence being continuous and contributory 
with that of defendant bars a recovery." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the doctrine may be applied only if it may fairly 
be said that plaintiff's negligence was "remote in causa-
tion. " [14] What then is the main factor which may make 
plaintiff's negligence, in the eyes of the law, a remote cause 
rather than a proximate cause of the accident 7 It is obviously 
the existence of some such appreciable interval after the 
time that plaintiff has reached a state of helplessness as to 
enable defendant to gain actual knowledge of plaintiff's state 
of helplessness, and to have a last clear chance to avoid the 
accident. And as above indicated, such state of helplessness 
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is reached only when plaintiff's negligence has placed him 
"in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by 
the exercise of ordinary care" either (1) because it is "physi-
cally impossible for him to escape" or (2) because he is 
"totally unaware of his danger and for that reason unable 
to escape." [15] Accordingly, when a plaintiff is actually 
aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle and when 
his negligent act, which removes him from a position of 
safety and into a position of danger, occurs almost simul-
taneously with the happening of the accident, there can be 
no such appreciable interval thereafter as to enable defendant 
to gain knowledge of plaintiff's helplessness and to have a 
last clear chance to avoid the accident. In such case, the 
negligence of plaintiff cannot be deemed to be "remote in 
causation." On the contrary, such negligence is, in the 
eyes of the law, a proximate cause of the accident, and the 
last clear chance doctrine has no application. 
In the light of the above discussion, it appears clear that 
the cases involved on this appeal presented no substantial 
evidence upon which to predicate the application of the last 
clear chance doctrine. We have heretofore indicated that 
there was no evidence to show that plaintiffs were totally 
unaware of the danger, for they testified that they saw the 
approaching bus twice after leaving the south curb-first 
immediately after leaving the south curb and again when in 
the center of the street. It is also clear that plaintiffs cannot 
successfully claim that defendants had a last clear chance 
to avoid the accident after plaintiffs had left their position 
of safety near the center of the street and stepped into a 
position of danger. [16a] Plaintiffs were not in a position 
of danger nor in a state of helplessness, within the meaning 
of the doctrine, until they had reached a point where they 
could no longer escape by the exercise of ordinary care. 
[17] As was said in Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73 Cal.App. 
2d 427, at page 435, "the term 'place of safety' ordinarily 
includes the position of the plaintiff while he is merely 
approaching the place of danger, and so long as he is only 
approaching but is not actually in a position of danger, the 
plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine." 
[16b] The distance from the center of the street to the 
north curb was but 22 feet 4% inches. There were auto-
mobiles parked along the curb, thus leaving only the inter-
ven"ing space for the bus to operate along the northerly half 
of the street, where the accident occurred at a point within 
\ 
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a few feet from the center line of the street. Plaintiffs' 
state of helplessness was created only by their act of leaving 
their position of safety near the center of the street and 
stepping directly into the path of danger. Under any view 
of the evidence, plaintiffs could not have taken more than 
two or three steps after leaving a place of safety and before 
the accident happened. Therefore plaintiffs' act of negli-
gence in leaving a place of safety and stepping directly into 
the path of the oncoming bus necessarily occurred almost 
simultaneously with the happening of the accident. Under 
these circumstances, such negligence cannot be deemed "re-
mote in causation," and it cannot be said that defendants 
thereafter had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. We 
therefore conclude that in each of these cases the trial court 
correctly determined by the challenged ruling that as a matter 
of law the record presented no substantial evi~ence to justify 
the application of the last clear chance doctrine. 
In Doran v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, S. F. 19190, 
the order granting a new trial is affirmed. In Bessette v. Oity 
&- Oounty of San F'rtmeisco, S. F. 19191, the judgment is 
affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the majority opinion for several reasons. 
The first of these reasons is that the facts have not been fairly 
stated. In determining the propriety of the order granting 
a new trial and of the refusal to give a requested jury instruc-
tion in these cases, the evidence is to be viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiffs. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Ca1.2d 
290 [246 P.2d 663] ; Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Fran-
cisco, 40 Ca1.2d 614 [255 P.2d 785].) The appeal in these 
cases is presented on settled statements of facts submitted 
by plaintiffs with amendments proposed by defendants. The 
excerpts from the settled statements, quoted in the majority 
opinion, appear to be the excerpts least favorable to the 
plaintiffs and most favorable to defendant. In some instances 
the excerpts attributed to plaintiff Doran have been taken 
from the statement submitted by plaintiff Bessette. They 
do not appear in the settled statement of facts submitted by 
plaintiff Doran. 
TESTIMONY OF BESSETTE 
From the testimony of plaintiff Bessette as it appears in 
the settled stateme~t of facts, the majoriq opinioA quotes: 
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When he " .•• saw the bus for the second time, he 'could 
not tell if it moved any distance from the point where he 
first saw it when it was stopped'" Read in the context of 
the majority opinion, these words seem to imply that plaintiff 
Bessette simply did not know where the bus was located 
when he saw it the second time. That inference seems to 
be the basis for the later statement of the majority that 
plaintiffs were not totally unaware of the danger because 
they knew that the bus was moving toward them when they 
reached the center of the street. Read in the context in 
which it was submitted to this court in the settled statements 
of facts, this excerpt conveys a far different meaning. Com-
pare the words quoted in the majority opinion with these 
statements, which appear in the same settled statements of 
facts as the testimony of plaintiff Bessette, which the majority 
opinion apparently ignores: 
"We walked about 6 or 7 feet into the street, going north, 
and then stopped to look for traffic. We saw no moving 
traffic in either direction, but saw the bus stopped at the 
corner near the drugstore, with the back wheel of the bus 
extending into the intersection. The visibility was good and 
when I looked to my left (west) I was able to see beyond 
Steiner Street, and was able to see the houses up there." 
"We proceeded across the street and when I reached near 
the center of the street I noticed that the bus was just begin-
ning to move from the stopped position. It' don' , go hardly 
at all, it just beginning to move.' (Sic) I continued right 
across, going straight, not diagonally, and I don't remember 
what happened after that." 
"When I was in the middle of the street I looked to my 
right to see the bus, what the bus was doing there at the 
corner. As far as I could see, the bus was just beginning 
to move." 
"The last time I saw the bus it was northwest of Fillmore 
near the front of the drugstore. When the bus was just 
starting to move, it was right there in the same place that 
I was looking the first time. I never saw the bus after that. 
I know I was walking to the middle of street but after that 
I don't know what happened to me. When I was at the 
center of the street I didn't stop but continued to walk. I 
know I was past the middle of the street when the accident 
occurred but I don't know how far past." 
"When he was looking at the bus again to see what the 
bus was doing when he reached the center of the street and 
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saw the bus just starting up, it seemed to him that he had 
plenty of time to cross." 
"Portions of the witness's testimony given in his deposition 
were read into the record in which he said: 'I did not see 
the bus just before it hit me.' He can't say how far he had 
walked from his position in the center of the street up to 
the time he was knocked out, because he doesn't really know." 
"He did not recall hearing the sound of a horn, bell or 
gong or any other sound coming from the bus at any time 
prior to the accident." 
"That he was wearing some sort of light colored overcoat 
at the time of the accident. 'Yes, maybe it was a sort of 
greenish-gray.' " 
"When he first saw the bus, when it was stopped at the 
corner, it was about 120 or 125 feet away from where he 
stopped to look for traffic when he was standing about 6 or 7 
feet out from the south curb." 
"When he got to the middle of the street he looked to the 
right and saw the bus again; he could not tell if it moved 
any distance from the point where he first saw it when it 
was stopped." 
, 'When he looked at the bus a second time it was about 
120 to 125 feet from him. From the time he left the sidewalk 
until the time he got to the center of the street the bus hadn't 
moved any distance at all, it was still in the same place, 
right there at the corner." 
"I knew the bus was moving in my direction but I did 
not alter the speed of my walk because I had plenty of time, 
the bus was so far I took my eyes off the bus and I never 
looked at it again to see what was happening to it." 
"When he passed the center of the street and saw the 
bus start to move, he never looked in the direction from which 
the bus was coming, and never looked at the bus again." 
I believe it is quite clear that the brief excerpt of plaintiff 
Bessette's testimony appearing in the majority opinion is not 
a fair statement of the general tenor of his testimony. 
Wrenched out of context, as it is in the majority opinion, 
it is perhaps as favorable to defendant as any excerpt which 
could have been found. It obviously does not represent a 
view of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 
The majority infers that plaintiff Bessette knew the bus 
was coming toward him, did not know (nor apparently care) 
how far away it was, and recklessly stepped into its path. 
The evidence viewed as a whole indicates to the contrary, 
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that plaintiff Bessette saw the bus still at the corner, 120 
feet away, just beginning to move, and so continued to walk 
across the street in the mistaken, but reasonable belief that 
he had plenty of time. 
TESTIMONY OF DORAN 
From the testimony of plaintiff Doran, the majority opinion 
quotes the following excerpts: "When I was in the middle 
of the street, I don't know how far the bus was from me. 
I know the bus was going in my direction. . .. I cannot tell 
you if it had gone half way. I don't know if it was as close 
as 10 feet to me when I saw it the second time. As I was 
crossing the street, I know the bus was coming in my direc-
tion but I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or 
would continue to go along." 
Let us analyze this excerpt one sentence at a time, and 
compare it with other excerpts from the same settled state-
ments. The first sentence quoted by the majority opinion 
is "When I was in the middle of the street, I don't know 
how far the bus was from me." This sentence appeared 
originally in the settled statement of facts submitted by 
plaintiff Bessette. It did not appear in the settled statement 
of facts submitted by plaintiff Doran. Compare the quoted 
sentence with these statements, referring to the same sub-
ject matter, which the majority apparently ignores: 
"When we reached the middle of the street between the 
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw 
the bus in about the same position, just beginning to move 
in my direction." 
"I saw the bus a second time when I was about the middle 
of the street. The bus was in the same position mostly 
and Mr. Bessette was on my right." 
"Before we got to the middle of the street I was looking 
and when I was in the middle of the street I was looking 
again watching the bus." "The bus started to move when 
I was about in the middle of the street. After I started 
across the street when I saw the bus down at the corner 
I next looked to see where the bus was when I was in the 
middle. After that I didn't look any more." 
The inference which the majority draws from the single 
sentence quoted by it, is that plaintiff Doran did not know 
how far away the bus was. The inference logically to be 
drawn from the whole testimony is that plaintiff Doran did 
know about how far away the bus was-she knew that it waa 
Btill at the eonlel", about 120 feet awq. 
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The second sentence of plaintiff Doran's testimony quoted 
by the majority opinion is: "I know the bus was going in 
my direction .... " This sentence also does not appear in 
the settled statement of plaintiff Doran. Again, however, 
the majority has ignored these references which seem per-
tinent: 
"When we reached the middle of the street between the 
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw 
the bus in about the same position, just beginning to move 
in my direction." 
"When I looked the second time the bus was moving. I 
can't tell you how close it was to me. I don't know if it 
had left the position of the nearest corner." 
The inference which the majority apparently draws from 
the sentence which it quotes is that plaintiff Doran saw the 
bus moving at full speed down the street toward her. The 
evidence viewed as a whole will not support that inference. 
A logical inference which may be drawn from the whole 
testimony is that plaintiff Doran saw the bus still at the corner, 
120 feet away, just beginning to move. 
The third and fourth sentences in the quoted paragraph 
of the majority opinion were "I cannot tell you if it had 
gone half way. I don't know if it was as close as 10 feet 
to me when I saw it the second time." Of the quoted para-
graph, these are the first sentences which actually do appear 
in the settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. But 
compare them with these words, which also appear in plain-
tiff Doran's statement and which the majority ignored: 
"When we reached the middle of the street between the 
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw 
the bus in about the same position [about 120 feet away], 
just beginning to move in my direction." 
"The bus was in the same position mostly [about 120 feet 
away] and Mr. Bessette was on my right." 
"The bus started to move [from its position at the corner 
about 120 feet away] when I was about in the middle· of 
the street." 
The majority picks out isolated sentences which imply that 
plaintiff Doran did not know how far away the bus was i 
but the majority ignores the many statements in the record 
that indicate that plaintiff Doran did know that the bus 
was about 120 feet away when she was at the middle of the 
street. 
The last senteAee in the quoted paraaraph ja "Ali 1 waa 
) 
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crossing the street, I know the bus was coming in my direction 
but I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or would 
continue to go along." Again, there is no such statement 
in the settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. There 
does not seem to be any direct reference in the statement 
submitted by plaintiff Doran as to plaintiff Doran's knowledge 
of "whether the bus was going to stop or would continue to 
go along." 
All of these purportedly representative excerpts of plaintiff 
Doran's testimony were culled by the majority from the state-
ment of facts submitted by plaintiff Bessette. I cannot under-
stand how, if the majority opinion was guided by the con-
trolling principle that the evidence is to be viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, it could have ignored such 
statements as I have quoted above. On the same page of 
the Bessette statement that the majority quotes plaintiff 
Doran as saying, "When I was in the middle of the street 
I don't know how far away the bus was from me," appears 
the statement "When I was in the middle of the street I 
saw the bus just beginning to move." Can it possibly be 
said that the majority views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs' Can it be said that the facts have 
been fairly stated' I think not. 
The majority paints a word picture of plaintiff Doran 
walking to the middle of the street, seeing a large bus bearing 
down on her, apparently quite close, and blandly stepping 
in front of it with no idea whether it would stop or not. This 
picture is but a sadly distorted remnant of the original por-
trayal which appeared in the evidence. A clearer view shows 
plaintiff Doran walking to the center of the street; seeing 
the bus about 120 to 125 feet away, just beginning to move; 
and continuing across the street with a feeling of apparent 
safety; only to be struck down by the bus which rapidly 
covered the intervening distance. 
TESTIMONY OF THE Bus DRIVER 
The testimony of the bus driver is summarized in the 
majority opinion somewhat accurately. Minor discrepancies 
in the majority's summary include (1) " .•. he was trav-
eling between 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw 
plaintiffs ..•. " The testimony was that he was traveling 
20 miles per hour when he first saw them. (2) "Traveling 
at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw 
plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the bus within 23 
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to 26 feet, including reaction time." The testimony was, 
"Under the conditions present at that time and place, with 
the bus travelling at 20 miles per hour, I could stop that 
bus within 23 to 26 feet, including reaction time. JJ (3) The 
bus driver did not, as the majority opinion intimates, specify 
the colors of the clothing worn by plaintiffs. 
I believe that a fair statement of the evidence in the light 
most favorable to plaintiffs would have brought out, as the 
settled statements of fact did, (1) that the bus driver from 
his experience in driving along those streets, had found that 
the dim lights sufficiently lighted up the road for the purpose 
of operating the bus-that he could see whatever it was neces-
sary to see in operating the bus. (2) That the bus headlights 
lit up the whole street from curb to curb. (3) That before 
starting up from the corner he could see right and left and 
in front. (4) That all of the time, up to the time of impact, 
he was looking strll,ight ahead. (5) That cars were outlined 
quite clearly and he had no trouble in seeing them. (6) He 
had a perfect field of vision (peripheral vision) and 20-20 
VISIOn. These facts, coupled with the plaintiffs' testimony 
that when they were in the middle of the street, the bus 
was still at the corner, just starting to move, could quite 
clearly lead to the inference that the bus driver saw the 
plaintiffs when he was 120 feet away from them (Belinsky v. 
Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 105 [237 P.2d 645]; Hoy v. 'l'ornich, 
199 Cal. 545 [250 P. 565] ; Bailey v. W,,1son, 16 Cal.App.2d 
645 [61 P.2d 68] ; Hellman v. Bradley, 13 Cal.App.2d 159 
[56 P.2d 607]). If a jury should draw this inference, there 
would be little trouble in holding that the last clear chance 
doctrine is applicable. Clearly that inference could be drawn, 
and would be upheld on any appeal, since there is evidentiary 
support for it. A jury would not be bound by the direct 
testimony of the defendant bus driver. Even less bound by 
defendant's testimony are we, who are supposed to be viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. 
The majority opinion states that the only real conflict in 
the evidence was on the question of whether plaintiffs walked 
straight, or ran diagonally, across the street. Having set 
up this defenseless "straw man," the majority then strikes 
it down by magnanimously accepting plaintiffs' testimony that 
they walked straight across. In the entire majority opinion, 
this is apparently the only point on which the evidence has 
been viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, as required by law. 
(Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra; Daniel$ v. Citll "" Count" of 
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San Francisco, supra.) Having complied with the law on this 
one minor point, the majority then apparently feels that it 
is free to ignore the more significant items of evidence. The 
majority opinion commences with the above mentioned correct 
statement, then continues with a distortion of the facts by 
which the majority seeks to prove that "there could not 
possibly have been any appreciable interval between the time 
that they [plaintiffs] left a place of safety and the time that 
the accident occurred." From the conflicting evidence in 
the record, the majority assumes that the accident occurred 
about 6 feet from the center of the street. From this one, 
isolated fact (which itself was contradicted by the direct 
testimony of plaintiff Bessette, who testified that to the best 
of his recollection he took six or seven steps after leaving 
the center of the street before he was hit) the majority 
attempts to prove a measure of time by use of a statement of 
linear measurement. To prove that no appreciable time 
passed while plaintiffs took the six or seven steps, it would 
be necessary to know the rate of speed at which plaintiffs 
were walking. The only direct evidence of the rate of speed 
of plaintiffs' walk is the testimony that they were walking 
at an ordinary walk, and that they didn't hurry, speed up 
or slow down while crossing the street. The only facts from 
which their rate of speed could be inferred are the facts that 
plaintiff Bessette was 74 years old, and that there were street-
car tracks in the street. From these facts it could be inferred 
that an ordinary walk for plaintiff Bessette might be slower 
than an ordinary walk for a younger, more agile youth. 
There is no evidence in the record as to the agility or gait 
of the plaintiffs. Clearly, the majority was forced to make 
assumptions wholly unwarranted by the record in order to 
support the decision which it had dogmatically determined it 
was going to reach. 
Continuing with the same paragraph, the majority opinion 
states: "In this situation it is understandable that plaintiffs 
should have admitted that they did not know how far the 
bus was from them when they were at the center of the street 
or how many steps they took after passing the center of the 
street; and in the light of these admissions and the above-
mentioned admitted facts, any testimony of plaintiffs to the 
effect that the bus was still at the corner (about 120 feet 
away) and was just starting to move at the time that plain-
tiffs crossed the center of the street is inherently improbable 
as it cannot be reconciled with the happening of the accident. 
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Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be substantial 
evidence on that subject." This statement demonstrates the 
absolute unfairness of the position taken by the majority 
in order to prevail in this action. It cannot reconcile the 
conclusion it wants to reach with the factual situation dis-
closed by plaintiffs' testimony, so it blandly says such testi-
mony is "inherently improbable." In the light of the record 
before us in this case such a holding is unworthy of a court 
of justice. 
To arrive at its predetermined conclusion the majority is 
forced to ignore the repeated direct testimony of the plaintiffs 
that the bus was still at the corner, 120 feet away, when they 
were at the center of the street. The majority attempts to 
justify its action by holding that the testimony of the plain-
tiffs is "inherently improbable." The only support for the 
charge of inherent improbability is the assumed fact that the 
accident occurred approximately 6 feet from the center of 
the street. I submit that there is nothing inherently improb-
able in plaintiffs' testimony that the bus was still at the 
corner, 120 feet away, when they were at the center of the 
street. The evidence clearly indicates that the bus driver 
started the bus by pressing the accelerator all the way to 
the floor and that the bus reached the speed of 20 miles an 
hour before hitting plaintiffs. There is nothing in the evi-
dence to indicate that the bus driver took his foot off of the 
accelerator until he was very close to plaintiffs. There is no 
indication in the evidence of the maximum rate of acceleration 
of the bus. Simple mathematical computation will show that 
a bus traveling 20 miles per hour will cover the distance of 
120 to 125 feet in less than five seconds. I submit that, even 
allowing a reasonable time for acceleration, it would be quite 
possible for the bus to cover the distance from the corner to 
the point of impact in not more than six or seven seconds, 
and that it would be equally possible for plaintiff Bessette, 
a 74-year-old man, to take six or seven seconds to walk six 
or seven steps across the streetcar tracks. How, may I ask, 
can t.he majority find inherent improbability in such testi-
mony 1 It can do so only by blindly and arbitrarily dis-
regarding inferences and deductions to be drawn from the 
evidence which has been accepted as reasonable and probable 
by at least seven judges and 12 jurors who have passed on 
the record in the Doran case. 
The rule has long been settled in this state that contradic-
tions in the testimony of a witness, even if the witness is the 
) 
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plaintiff, create nothing more than a conflict in the evidence 
and an appellate court is required to treat such conflict the 
same as if it existed between two or more witnesses. Conflict-
ing testimony of a plaintiff constitutes nothing more than a 
conflict in the evidence to be resolved by the trial court. 
(Rice v. Oalifornia Lutheran Hospital, 27 Ca1.2d 296 f163 
P.2d 860] ; O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Ca1.2d 145 [195 P.2d 10] ; 
Bushey v. Union Oil 00., 13 Cal.App.2d 350 [56 P.2d 1272] ; 
Von Hasseln v. Von Hasseln, 122 Cal.App.2d 7 [264 P.2d 
205] .) Where the jury accepts plain tiff's testimony notwith-
standing its contradictions, the appellate court must do so 
unless it is so inherently improbable as to be no evidence. 
(Miller v. Schimming, 129 Cal.App. 171 [18 P.2d 357].) 
"Common experip.nce and observation teach us that strange 
and astonishing things sometimes happen in the world of 
physical phenomena, and accidents sometimes appear to hap-
pen in manner unaccountable. For these reasons an appellate 
court must be careful not to give to dogmatic and undemon-
strated conclusions respecting natural laws precedence over 
the testimony of apparently credible witnesses; and the mere 
fact that the admitted circumstances make the story of the 
witnesses seem improbable will not justify a reversal by an 
appellate tribunal upon the ground that the verdict is contrary 
to the evidence. (Austin v. Newton, 46 Cal.App. 493. 498 
[189 P. 471] ; see also Postier v. Landau, 121 Cal.App.2d 98 
[262 P.2d 565] ; Murphy v. Ablow, 123 Cal.App.2d 853 [268 
P.2d 80] ; Jones v. Re-Mine Oil 00., 47 Ca1.App.2d 832 [119 
P.2d 219]; Bennett v. Chandler, 52 Ca1.App.2d 255 [126 
P.2d 173]; Poe v. Lawrence, 60 Ca1.App.2d 125 [140 P.2d 
136].) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated above, I do not believe that the facts are fairly 
stated in the majority opinion. The summary of the facts 
to which the majority opinion applies the law could con-
ceivably be drawn from the submitted statements, but it is 
emphatically not a view of the evidence most favorable to 
plaintiffs. It is not even an impartial view of the evidence. 
It is a view of the evidence most favorable to defendant. 
Many different versions of the facts could be drawn from the 
settled statements of facts submitted by the plaintiffs. I 
propose that we adopt a version as favorable to the plaintiffs 
as the evidence will reasonably allow. 
On March 17, 1950, about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck 
by defendant'8 electric overhead trolley bus as they were 
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crossing Union Street at a point approximately 120 to 125 
feet west of its intersection with Fillmore Street, in San 
Francisco. Plaintiff Jules Bessette, accompanied by plaintiff 
Jeanne Doran, had parked his automobile on the south side 
of Union Street, about 110 to 120 feet west of Fillmore. 
Union Street is relatively narrow, being 44 feet 9 inches 
from curb to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs 
on both sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west 
on the sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into 
Union Street intending to cross the street to a theater on 
the opposite (north) side. They walked a few steps into 
the street, stopped and looked both ways for traffic. They 
saw no moving traffic in either direction, but on their right, 
they saw defendant's trolley bus, stopped at the corner of 
Union and Fillmore Streets, on the west side of Fillmore, 
about 120 to 125 feet away from where they stood. The sun 
had gone down and it was nighttime, but the visibility was 
good, the street well lighted. They resumed walking straight 
across the street. When they reached the middle of the street, 
both plaintiffs again looked to the right (east) to see what 
the bus was doing. It was still at or near the corner, about 
120 feet away, but had just begun to move. Believing that 
they had plenty of t:me to cross, they took their eyes off 
the bus, looked straight ahead and continued straight across 
the street. They did not stop at the center of the street, 
but looked to the right while walking. 
Meanwhile, the bus driver, who had 20-20 vision and perfect 
peripheral vision, had started the bus by pushing the accel. 
erator all the way to the floor. He was looking straight 
ahead, in the direction of plaintiffs. There were no obstruc-
tions to his view. There was no glare from the inside lights 
to interfere with his view. The bus headlights were on low 
beam, but this was adequate to see all that was necessary to 
be seen for operation of the bus. The lights lit up the whole 
street from curb to curb. He drove straight ahead until ha 
was within 15 or 20 feet of plaintiffs, at which time he pushed 
on the brake pedal and turned the wheels to the left. The 
right front side of the bus struck plaintiffs, and the bus 
continued for about 8 feet after the impact before it came 
to a stop. The point of impact was about six or seven steps 
north of the center of the street, where plaintiffs last looked 
to see the bus at the corner. The bus driver admits that he 
did not sound his horn and that he did not apply his brakes 
when he first saw the plaintiffs, but he claims that he did 
JI.Ot see them lUltil he was 15 or 20 feet away from them. 
) 
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APPLICATION OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINB 
With this statement of the facts in mind, let us proceed to 
a discussion of the application of the last clear chance doc-
trine. The last clear chance doctrine is applicable in very 
few cases. The case now before this court is one of thos(' few 
cases. Whether or not the doctrine applies in a particular 
case, as correctly pointed out by the majority, depends on 
the existence or nonexistence of certain factual elements. The 
majority opinion has adequately set out the nature of those 
factual elements. What remains is to see whether or not 
those elements are present in this case. 
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here 
because plaintiffs were aware of their dangerous position and 
could have saved themselves by the exercise of ordinary care. 
Plaintiffs may have been negligent in crossing the street in 
the middle of the block when there were marked crosswalks 
at the end of the block. But it does not follow that they 
were aware of any danger from the bus. They saw it stopped 
at the corner, walked to the middle of the narrow street, 
looked again and saw it still a. the corner, just beginning to 
move. They did not look at it again, believing they had 
plenty of time to cross. They took six or seven more steps 
and were hit. Awareness of the fact that a bus 120 feet away 
is beginning to move does not constitute awareness of the 
danger which actually was present. If it did, every pedes-
trian who crosses a city street would be in a constant state 
of awareness of imminent peril, since there is usually some 
traffic moving toward ~i1e when he crosses a street. The 
evidence in this case, viewed reasonably, clearly shows that 
plaintiffs were totally unaware of any danger. 
The majority opinion erroneously assumes that plaintiffs 
were "fully aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle 
up to the instant before the collision. . . ." The majority 
seems to believe that the plaintiffs were bent on suicide. It 
intimates that the plaintiffs saw the bus right on top of 
them and blithely ignored it as they stepped into its path. 
No reasonable reading of the evidence could give that im-
pression. 
The case of Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696 [218 P. 36], 
which the majority opinion describes as "closely parallel on 
its facts, " has no application to this case, because it is clearly 
distinguishable on its facts. I agree with the learned justices 
of the District Court of Appeal, who stated in their decision 
that the Palmer case was l!ot applicable to this case « Cal. 
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App.) 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840). They said: II Palmer v. 
Tschudy [citation], is not applicable here for the reason, 
first, that the facts are different. There the court held that 
the plaintiff was aware of the danger from the approaching 
automobile and by the exercise of ordinary care could have 
avoided the accident, and hence the first element above men-
tioned required to apply the doctrine was not present. Sec-
ondly, the court there relied on the narrow interpretation of 
the doctrine given in Young v. Southern Pac. 00. [citation], 
to the effect that one is not in a position of danger until he 
actually gets in the pathway of the oncoming vehicle. This 
interpretation, like that given in Rodabaugh v. Tekus [cita-
tion], was held in Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco 
[citation], not to apply where the driver is aware, as here, 
of the fact that the other person is coming directly into his 
path. " There is the additional factual distinction in the 
Palmer case, that the plaintiff had audible warning of the 
approach of the automobile, the driver of which twice sounded 
his horn. No horn was sounded here. 
Other cases which the majority opinion purportedly dis-
tinguishes (Girdner v. Union Oil 00., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 
915] ; Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., 216 Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918]; 
Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977]) are 
all applicable to the extent at least that they hold that one 
who is totally unaware of the approaching danger may be 
in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by the 
exercise of ordinary care; that it need not be physically im-
possible for him to escape in order to qualify under this re-
quirement. 
It is interesting to note that the majority opinion in its 
summary of the "facts" near the conclusion of the opinion, 
states that plaintiffs were in a position of safety near the 
center of the street, and not in a position of danger. I had 
thought that this question was settled by the case of Daniels v. 
Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 621, 
where the same writer held that the plaintiff was in a position 
of danger even though not directly in the path of the oncoming 
bus, but only approaching its path. No reference to the 
Daniels case was made in the majority discussion on this 
point. 
On the question of whether defendant had knowledge that 
the plaintiffs were in a position of danger and knew or should 
have known that plaintiffs could not escape, the evidence 
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plaintiffs when he was 120 to 125 feet away from them. The 
bus driver himself states that he did not see them look in 
his direction, that they just crossed in front of him. 
In light of the preceding discussion, no comment should be 
necessary as to the presence of the third factual element for 
the application of the last clear chance doctrine. By any 
reasonable view of the evidence, the defendant had the last 
clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary 
care, and he failed to exercise the same, thereby proximately 
causing the plaintiffs' injuries. 
THE UNDERLYING ERROR IN THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The astonishing thing about the majority opinion is that 
even if one accepted as a starting point the erroneous and 
slanted view which it takes of the facts, and even though in 
most (but not all) particulars it correctly states the rules of 
law, still it reaches a result contrary to established principles 
of law and logic. 
In reviewing the cases on the last clear chance doctrine, 
the majority opinion states, "The question of whether there 
is any substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which 
could justify the application of the last clear chance doctrine 
in a given case, is a question of law; and in the absence of 
such evidence, it is error for the trial court to instruct the 
jury concerning that doctrine. [Citations.] On the other 
hand. if there is such substantial evidence, conflicting or 
otherwise, the question of whether the defendant should be 
held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident is 
a question of fact to be determjned by the jury under appro-
priate instructions. [Citations.] " 
I know of only one test for determining whether or not 
there is an issue of fact which should be submitted to a 
jury for its determination, and that is the so-called "reason-
able minds" test. I have never heard another test suggested 
and I know of no other basis for determining this question. 
In applying this test it would seem that when a trial court 
has concluded that an issue of fact exists, and submits such 
issue to a jury, and the jury, on proper instructions, deter-
mines that issue of fact, I can see no basis whatever in 
reason or common sense for an appellate court to hold that no 
issue of fact exists. 
This court has in numerous cases stated without equivo-
cation that" Even where the facts are undisputed, if reason-
able minds might draw different conclusions upon the question 
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of negligence, the question is one of fact for the jury." 
(Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520]; 
Seller v. Market Street Ry. 00., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006]; 
Herbert v. Southern Pac. 00., 121 Cal. 227 l53 P. 651) ; Zibbell 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513]; see dis-
senting opinion, Gray v. Brinkerhoff. 41 Ca1.2d 180, 186, 
192 [258 P.2d 834].} Can it possibly be said in the case 
at bar that reasonable minds cannot draw different con-
clusions from the evidence contained in the record in this 
case on the question as to whether or not the necessary 
elements are present to give rise to the doctrine of last clear 
chance Y The answer to this question is obvious. That reason-
able minds have drawn different conclusions is demonstrated 
by the record before us. The trial judge in the Doran case 
gave a last clear chance instruction and the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The three members of the 
District Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a last clear chance instruction (Cal. 
App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840, and three members of 
this court have arrived at the same conclusion. In view 
of this state of the record, it seems clear that the case is 
decided in accordance with the view of the majority because 
there are four members of this court who feel it should be 
so decided, and it must necessarily follow that all cases of 
this character will take the same course. The reasonable 
minds test which has been followed by this court and all 
other common law courts since time immemorial, is without 
force or effect so long as four members of this court see fit 
to arbitrarily conclude that the rule is not applicable to a 
case involving a particular factual situation to which they 
think the doctrine should not apply. 
The majority opinion in this case is an outright usurpation 
of the fact finding function of the trial court in at least two 
particulars: (1) It is held that the elements necessary for 
application of the last clear chance doctrine were not present 
as a matter of law; (2) it is held as a matter of law that the 
defendant did not have a last chance or a clear chance to 
avoid the accident. The unsoundness of the majority opinion 
on these two points is clearly shown by tracing the steps in 
these cases. (The cases being joined in this appeal, and the 
evidence being substantially the same in each, the Doran case 
is outlined as the more graphic example.) (a) Evidence was 
presented on each of the two points stated above. (b) The 
trial judie, in the first instance, decided that theae werQ 
) 
Apr. 1951"'1 DORAN t1. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FBANmsOG 505 
r44 C.2d '77: 283 P.2d 1] 
questions of fact, therefore gave them to the jury for deter-
mination. (c) The jury found certain facts to be true. (It 
is not necessary to detail the findings-the logic is the same 
in any case.) (d) The trial judge granted a new trial. (e) 
The three able justices of the District Court of Appeal unani-
mously decided that reasonable minds could differ on the 
evidence presented, therefore reversed the order granting a 
new trial. (See Doran v. Oity &- Oounty of Ban Francisco 
(Cal.App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840.) (f) On appeal 
to this court, a majority of the court decides that reasonable 
minds could not differ on the evidence presented, therefore 
affirms the order granting a new trial. As I pointed out in 
my concurring opinion in Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of Ban 
Francisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614, 628, by holding that reason-
able minds could not differ, the majority of this court is 
saying that the trial judge, the trial jury, the members of 
the District Court of Appeal, and their dissenting brethren 
on this court do not have reasonable minds. If the majority 
opinion says any less than this, then the problem is one of 
semantics. The law is clear; the logic is inescapable; the 
only possible reconciliation of the majority opinion and 
common sense must be found in divergence of opinion as to 
the meaning of the words used. The meaning which I attach 
to the words of the majority opinion shows to me that the 
majority opinion is illogical. 
This is not the first case of this sort to come before this 
court. Nor is this the first time that the majority has fol-
lowed this illogical course (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 
39 Ca1.2d 290; Gore v. Market Street Ry. 00., 4 Ca1.2d 154 
[48 P.2d 2] ; Young v. Southern Pac. 00., 182 Cal. 369 [190 
P. 36]). Nor is this the first time that I have expressed my 
views on this subject (see Belinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 
102; dissenting opinions, Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal. 
2d 290; Bparks v. Redinger, ante, pp. 121,126 [279 P.2d 971] ; 
concurring opinion, Dam:els v. Oity &- Oounty of San Fran-
cisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614; Recent Trends in Oourt Decisions 
in Oalifornia, 5 Hast. L.J. 133). Unless we wish to repeal 
the portions of the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of· California which guarantee 
the right to trial by jury, the result of this case must not be 
allowed to stand. 
I would commend to the majority of this court a reading 
of the history of the development of the jury system (e. g., 
James B. Thayer, Tha Jurll and ItB Development, 5 Harv. 
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L.Rev. 249 (1892).) A cursory examination of that history 
will show that from its first establishment as a part of our 
system of law, the jury has had the function of determining 
facts. From the twelfth century to date the controlling maxim 
has been Had questionern facti n01l respondent judices, ad 
questionem legis non respondent ,jurat ores. " This may be 
loosely translated as "the judges do not answer questions 
of fact, the jurors do not answer questions of law." The 
trend of decisions in this court clearly shows that some of my 
colleagues on this bench do not feel the weight of the 
centuries of history which have produced this rule. Do they 
seek a return to the feudal system or some other pre-twelfth 
century form of judicial administration' 
I would also recommend to the majority, a rereading and 
a reconsideration of the analysis of this problem which was 
made in my dissenting opinion in Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 
39 Ca1.2d 290, 297, 303. The closing statement which I 
made there perfectly fits the situation in this case. "I do 
not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that the record 
in this case presents a factual situation on which reasonable 
minds cannot differ. What has happened thus far demon-
strates beyond question that reasonable minds have arrived 
at different conclusions on the record before us. Such being 
the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is one of 
fact and not of law, and hence should be determined by the 
trier of fact-the jury in this case. 
e, While the majority opinion in this case will create great 
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other 
decisions of this court and the District Court of Appeal which 
I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reaching 
concern is the problem that it is in direct violation of the 
constitutional provision that 'the right of trial by jury shall 
be secured to all, and remain inviolate'; (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation 
is presented in a case in which litigants are entitled to a 
jury trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case 
from the jury and decides as a matter of law that there is 
no h;sue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been 
deprived of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been vio-
lated. Such is the situation in the case at bar. While this 
result may seem to be unimportant in this case, it has an 
insidious impact on our whole constitutional structure. If 
judges who have taken a sol('mn oath to support the Con-
stitution can ruthlessly disregard its provisions, as the ma-
and unalterably opposed to this trend in the decisions of 
this court. 
In these two cases, I would reverse the order and the judg. 
ment respectively. 
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, J.-We dissent. 
In our opinion the evidence was sufficient to justify the 
giving of instructions on the last clear chance doctrine. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 25, 
1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor. J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
